What?

This is a Giants blog first and foremost, but occasionally I like to get my rant on about something in the wider baseball world. Today the focus is the San Francisco Chronicle's Bruce Jenkins, who wrote a column describing how Billy Beane has forsaken "Moneyball" and how this has put the A's into contention once again.

As for the A's, it's nice to see one of the most tiresome catch-terms in sports, "Moneyball," get tossed onto the shelf - forever, if we're lucky.

I'm no fan of the A's, but I will defend Billy Beane and his approach until I no longer have to. So I don't have a whole of patience for baseless attacks on sabermetrics, which are common among newspaper columnists, as well as commentators on ESPN and the new MLB Network. Jenkins criticizes how, after the A's success earlier this decade, "people have spent the ensuing years trying to package Beane's strategy in a nice little box - and they've been hopelessly wrong." He then proceeds to...package Beane's strategy in a nice little box. And he's hopelessly wrong.

Jenkins cites the trade for Matt Holliday and the free agent signings of Orlando Cabrera and Nomar Garciaparra as evidence for the change in Oakland. What he doesn't realize is that these moves fit perfectly with Beane's strategy the past several years. Holliday is a rent-a-player. He will either be turned into several prospects at the deadline or a couple of draft picks in the offseason. He will make $9.5 million next year, about a third of what he's actually been worth the past two seasons, according to FanGraphs. Look at the players traded for Holliday. Carlos Gonzalez is a prospect with all the "tools" that scouts look for, but who has never had the numbers to back up that promise (.340 career minor league OBP). Huston Street is an overvalued reliever, who will be replaced by the much cheaper Joey Devine and Russ Springer. Greg Smith was moved to make room for younger and better pitchers like Brett Anderson and Trevor Cahill. Holliday is just the latest in a pattern that includes Johnny Damon, Jermaine Dye, and Ray Durham. If Beane were to sign him to a five-year contract, then we could start talking about a change in strategy.

The signings of Cabrera, Garciaparra, and Springer shouldn't come as any surprise either. Beane has a long history of finding undervalued players, like Scott Hatteberg, Jack Cust, and Frank Thomas. In the current market, every player is undervalued, and it's no shock that an astute GM like Beane would take advantage of this. Beane didn't sign these players because they are "quality veterans with a mural of postseason history," whatever that means. Or if he did, I've got a center fielder in San Francisco I'd like to sell him.

Here's another excerpt:

Beane was frankly disgusted as he watched his lineup perform last year, and who wasn't? Around the infield horn, each man had the lowest batting average at his position. Daric Barton, heralded as the essence of Beane's preoccupation with on-base percentage, consistently produced the most tedious at-bats in either league.

This is the one of the things that entertains me the most about critics of sabermetrics. They criticize the use of stats, but then use them if they back up their own assumptions. Jenkins cites the team's low batting average to make a (valid) point about the team's offense last year, but then mocks Beane for his "preoccupation with on-base percentage."

Did Bruce Jenkins even read Moneyball? Or do any research for this article?

Matt Holliday and Jason Giambi are two guys who go up there hacking, not looking to run a 3-1 count.

Jason Giambi: .408 career OBP, 4.30 pitches/plate appearance in 2008 (4th in MLB)
Matt Holliday: .386 career OBP, 3.88 P/PA in 2008

What many in the media don't understand is that "Moneyball" isn't the exception anymore. Every team has a department of statistical research. The Boston Red Sox were one of the first teams to catch on. They've been the most successful team of the decade.